

Community resources

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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 10USNATO42,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#10USNATO42**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
10USNATO42	2010-01-29 16:36	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Mission USNATO

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4028324.ece>

VZCZCXRO1744
PP RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHNO #0042 0291636
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291636Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3817
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDX/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000042
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PINR](#) [NATO](#) [RS](#)

Classified By: DCM John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

11. (C) In a conversation on NATO-Russia relations, Russian Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO Nikolai Korchunov said "transparency is a tool of the weak" during a January 27

lunch hosted by DCM Heffern. Korchunov made this statement in response to the DCM urging Russia to be more transparent about its intentions and actions, such as its recent military exercises held on NATO's border. Korchunov admitted that Russia and the U.S. did need to understand one another, but did not extend this need to other Allies. He claimed that his statement about the weak referred to those countries that "acted like babies" and were afraid of Russia.

12. (C) Korchunov explained that Russia did not consider NATO a real threat, and that the threats came from Russia's south. He hoped that since Russia and NATO faced many of the same threats this could result in greater practical cooperation through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). He lamented that "Cold Warriors" in Moscow remained wary of NATO and limited what Russia could do through the NRC. Korchunov said that both he and Russian Ambassador to NATO Rogozin wanted to improve the NATO-Russia relationship and advocated for closer cooperation in Moscow. He claimed that Rogozin had access to the top Russian leadership and urged that the U.S. and Russian Ambassadors work together on key issues rather than work through NATO. Korchunov thought it odd that the NATO International Staff, and not the U.S., had approached the Russian Mission to discuss the U.S. request to utilize the NATO-Russia transit agreement to move vehicles through Valdivostok to Afghanistan. The DCM responded that Allies worked through the Alliance to solve problems and could not dictate NATO positions or decisions. Korchunov indicated that Russia would approve the U.S. transit request.

13. (C) Korchunov said that NATO-Russia relations were not a priority for Moscow, which placed more importance on bilateral relations with individual NATO members. This factor made it difficult for the Russian Mission to NATO to attract diplomats. Many would rather serve at the Russian Mission to the EU, which was considered a higher profile post since the EU was Russia's largest trading partner. Korchunov said that NATO's 2009 expulsion of two Russian diplomats had only increased the post's undesirability. He reiterated denials that the two had been intelligence officers, and said that NATO was wrong to recently reject Russia's nominee for Political Counselor on the grounds that he too was a spy. Korchunov complained that the situation left him with a staff that was too small to handle its workload. (Note: The most recent NATO directory lists 27 people in the Political Section of the Russian Mission, several of whom have very thin portfolios. The Russian Political Section is considerably larger than that of any NATO member, including our own. End note.)
DAALDER